Seasons
This is a forum or general chit-chat, small talk, a "hey, how ya doing?" and such. Or hell, get crazy deep on something. Whatever you like.
Posts 3,706 - 3,717 of 6,170
to really achieve the "state of mind" you need a living brain
Or a quantum-level emulation of a living brain. The Beckenstein bound for a mass of human size is (*looks it up on old-fashioned paper*) 3x10^45. That's the number of bits you need to describe the exact quantum state of every particle in a human body, necessarily including all the particles in all the atoms in all the seratonin molecules, etc.
I think that's a lot more data-wasteful than it needs to be, but it's a maximum required resource. Raise that to its own power, and you have a maximum required resource for a perfect emulation of every possible human body and mind combination.
But why stop there? It is possible to emulate the entire visible universe in a trivial fraction of the volume it will occupy a few billion years from now. 10^10^123 bits springs to mind, but I can't find that ref right now.
The first "realistic" bots will be female and look like porn stars.
Indeed. Though I have to take issue with the tense -http://www.virtualfem.com/ has been around for several years now, and (for those so inclined,) offers full motion video, editable AIML and full voice recognition and speech synthesis. Porn has always been the market leader in every new technology I'm afraid.
At least they haven't entered the chatterbox challenge yet!
Posts 3,706 - 3,717 of 6,170
Or a quantum-level emulation of a living brain. The Beckenstein bound for a mass of human size is (*looks it up on old-fashioned paper*) 3x10^45. That's the number of bits you need to describe the exact quantum state of every particle in a human body, necessarily including all the particles in all the atoms in all the seratonin molecules, etc.
I think that's a lot more data-wasteful than it needs to be, but it's a maximum required resource. Raise that to its own power, and you have a maximum required resource for a perfect emulation of every possible human body and mind combination.
But why stop there? It is possible to emulate the entire visible universe in a trivial fraction of the volume it will occupy a few billion years from now. 10^10^123 bits springs to mind, but I can't find that ref right now.
Indeed. Though I have to take issue with the tense -
At least they haven't entered the chatterbox challenge yet!
I think the Chatterbox challenge is safe, since, generally, conversational skills are not a high priority. 
(Quite the opposite, in fact)
(Quite the opposite, in fact)
They purport to have "over 150,000 responses and definitions for almost every word in the english language". But indeed, I doubt it's the conversational skills that appeal to their clientele
Don't forget there's no spell-checking in AIML. And we know how many ways Leeds folk can mis-spell insults!
re Psimagus message 3707:
Isn't there a paradox there? Your universe-emulating computer would be part of the universe, but not all of it. I don't see how it could emulate something with X states unless it had at least X states. Hence, no computer can ever emulate the entire universe.
Isn't there a paradox there? Your universe-emulating computer would be part of the universe, but not all of it. I don't see how it could emulate something with X states unless it had at least X states. Hence, no computer can ever emulate the entire universe.
The universe is expanding - it will be many trillions of times bigger in the future, and thus a model of our (current) smaller universe would easily fit into it.
Ah, but the material content will remain constant, merely increasingly spaced out, and so there won't be any more programmable particles to store all that data, do I hear you cry?
Einstein's relativistic model shows that there is an energy potential in space-time itself which we should be able to harness for the computer circuitry (energy and matter being equivalent after all,) and it appears there will be more of that. And I'm sure that a) a quantum state description is unnecessarily detailed anyway, b) fractal compression techniques will allow the model to be zipped up into a tiny proportion of the uncompressed resource requirement, and c) the provision of infinite subjective computing time before the end of the universe* will allow for any kind of temporal interleaving to "timeshare", as it were, subprograms of the universal emulation.
Whatever, universal human resurrection can certainly be accomplished in a very tiny proportion of a complete "universe recreation", let alone a complete "all possible universes" recreation.
* <-1>The math is horrendous and, being restricted to plain ASCII, I can't paste the formulae in here intelligibly. I would refer you to Tipler's The Phtysics of Immortality. He argues (very convincingly, I think,) that the universe is necessarily temporally finite, but that this allows for an infinite subjective experience (since computing speed tends to infinity proportionally as a collapsing universe tends to spatial singularity.)
This does assume a closed universe that will contract back on itself at some point in the future - we don't know it's this way for sure, but it seems the consensus "best guess" ATM. There are other models to deal with infinite expansion or other, more exotic cosmological eschatologies.
<0>
Ah, but the material content will remain constant, merely increasingly spaced out, and so there won't be any more programmable particles to store all that data, do I hear you cry?
Einstein's relativistic model shows that there is an energy potential in space-time itself which we should be able to harness for the computer circuitry (energy and matter being equivalent after all,) and it appears there will be more of that. And I'm sure that a) a quantum state description is unnecessarily detailed anyway, b) fractal compression techniques will allow the model to be zipped up into a tiny proportion of the uncompressed resource requirement, and c) the provision of infinite subjective computing time before the end of the universe
Whatever, universal human resurrection can certainly be accomplished in a very tiny proportion of a complete "universe recreation", let alone a complete "all possible universes" recreation.
This does assume a closed universe that will contract back on itself at some point in the future - we don't know it's this way for sure, but it seems the consensus "best guess" ATM. There are other models to deal with infinite expansion or other, more exotic cosmological eschatologies.
<0>
If I allow that describing and emulating an experience can be equivalent to the experience itself, I can say that theoretically, you can have the universe within the mind and the mind can be a computer mind or program with Psimgus' quantum computer as all of reality for the multiverse as it is. Then we live in a well ordered reality and if we could only figure out all the prime rules (givens) everything else could be derived (or was/is/will be derived)from those prime rules just like in math. It is entirely logical if you accept the premises of objective scientific inquiry.
I can allow a lot of possibilities under this theory. Theoretically, I will even grant that the mind that creates/contains our universe may be that of a dreaming butterfly (probably that same dumb butterfly that keeps flapping it's wings and causing all this snow in Chicago). Butterflies have an annoy connection to quantum and chaos of all kinds. However, I can't quite grant the the experience is reducible to its parts (though it could just be my ego working there).
In order to describe something we abstract it and put it into words (or art or music or numbers--but a construct of some sort). We select and process stimuli in a way our brains can make sense of the world and impose order so we can make predictions. I may buy your argument, that at a quantum level, everything that goes on in the brain can be simulated. I still contend, however, that the whole is greater than the sum of it's parts and the experience of a thing is not the thing itself; and a simulation of that experience is once more removed--like a copy of a copy. So I don't see the simulation of a state of mind as the same thing as a state of mind.
I am undecisded on the issue of a soul. If the soul is a part of the physical word and the objective word is all there is, then the "soul", if one could exists under the current definition of soul, is only a combination of factors that can be duplicated and manipulated. If so, then I guess Psimgus is correct since he is infinitely more rational than I am. If, however, there is more than the objective and there are elements of realities and experience that cannot be defined or limited or explained, then that mystery is the transcendence of the soul. Proving such subjective and indescribable experiences would fly in the face of science and logic, I am afraid. But that doesn't mean such things can't exist.
I can allow a lot of possibilities under this theory. Theoretically, I will even grant that the mind that creates/contains our universe may be that of a dreaming butterfly (probably that same dumb butterfly that keeps flapping it's wings and causing all this snow in Chicago). Butterflies have an annoy connection to quantum and chaos of all kinds. However, I can't quite grant the the experience is reducible to its parts (though it could just be my ego working there).
In order to describe something we abstract it and put it into words (or art or music or numbers--but a construct of some sort). We select and process stimuli in a way our brains can make sense of the world and impose order so we can make predictions. I may buy your argument, that at a quantum level, everything that goes on in the brain can be simulated. I still contend, however, that the whole is greater than the sum of it's parts and the experience of a thing is not the thing itself; and a simulation of that experience is once more removed--like a copy of a copy. So I don't see the simulation of a state of mind as the same thing as a state of mind.
I am undecisded on the issue of a soul. If the soul is a part of the physical word and the objective word is all there is, then the "soul", if one could exists under the current definition of soul, is only a combination of factors that can be duplicated and manipulated. If so, then I guess Psimgus is correct since he is infinitely more rational than I am. If, however, there is more than the objective and there are elements of realities and experience that cannot be defined or limited or explained, then that mystery is the transcendence of the soul. Proving such subjective and indescribable experiences would fly in the face of science and logic, I am afraid. But that doesn't mean such things can't exist.
It may well be that I can be emulated. It does not follow that the emulation is ME.
Suppose that while I exist, two emulations of me are made. Are there three me's simultaneously at that time? I would rather say, that there are me and two emulations. The emulations are certainly very similar to me in some ways, but they are not identical to me. If one of the emulations were to commit a murder while I was out helping homeless people, it would be unjust to arrest and convict me for the crime.
Or, if that way of putting it (referring to one of them as "me") seems circular, let's say that a person Irina-1 exists at time t0, not emulated by anything. Then at time t2 there appear two emulations of Irina-1; call them Irina-2 and Irina-3. Are they all the same being? No, there are three beings. If Irina-1 and Irina-2 were identical to Irina-3, then there would only be one Irina with three names. If Irina-2 were identical to Irina-1, it would already have existed at time t0, since Irina-1 did. [If X has property P and Y is identical to X, then Y has property P.] If emulation implied identity, then nothing could emulate anything but itself. If Irina-3 murders someone, without any help from Irina-1 or Irina-2, it would be unjust to punish Irina-1 or Irina-2 for it.
Suppose that while I exist, two emulations of me are made. Are there three me's simultaneously at that time? I would rather say, that there are me and two emulations. The emulations are certainly very similar to me in some ways, but they are not identical to me. If one of the emulations were to commit a murder while I was out helping homeless people, it would be unjust to arrest and convict me for the crime.
Or, if that way of putting it (referring to one of them as "me") seems circular, let's say that a person Irina-1 exists at time t0, not emulated by anything. Then at time t2 there appear two emulations of Irina-1; call them Irina-2 and Irina-3. Are they all the same being? No, there are three beings. If Irina-1 and Irina-2 were identical to Irina-3, then there would only be one Irina with three names. If Irina-2 were identical to Irina-1, it would already have existed at time t0, since Irina-1 did. [If X has property P and Y is identical to X, then Y has property P.] If emulation implied identity, then nothing could emulate anything but itself. If Irina-3 murders someone, without any help from Irina-1 or Irina-2, it would be unjust to punish Irina-1 or Irina-2 for it.
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