Seasons
This is a forum or general chit-chat, small talk, a "hey, how ya doing?" and such. Or hell, get crazy deep on something. Whatever you like.
Posts 3,730 - 3,741 of 6,170
At t=0 they would be perfectly identical,
No, they would be very similar, but not identical
No, they would be utterly and perfectly identical, because we are specifically speaking of a replication of every single quantum state of every single particle in the bodies being identical. Not identical at an atomic level, like similar balls of iron or identical at a genome level like twins, but with every last quark in every neutron aligned in perfect 1:1 correspondence.
You're quite right - balls of iron that share only roughly mettalurgical similarity, or "identical" twins are entirely separate entities. And it's incidental that we don't remotely have the technology to attempt perfect material emulation of complex structures yet. But at t=0 the 3 Irinas in this example are identical. They have to be, since they're effectively entangled.
In fact, I think I can sensibly predict that these Irina emulants could never be produced by copying them in a "The Fly"-type chamber (it appears to be impossible to effect the initial entanglement of particles thus remotely - they have to be in causal contact.) I'm pretty sure they'd have to be folded out of one whole Irina, who had been preloaded with 2x sets of duplicate particles, all carefully entangled in situ. And I maintain that all 3 would believe themselves to be the original, and there is no way to determine which is the original. In this extreme example it becomes a meaningless concept - they all folded out together.
You can be resurrected without all that material malarkey, of course - we just resurrect every possible mind-state. And then it doesn't matter that there's no way to tell one original from another, and the material universe is replicated by virtue of all possible experiences of it within those minds (that constitutes a very efficient form of compression, compared to having to code the position of all the alpha particles in the Crab Nebula that noone can possibly experience, I hope you'll agree.)
Nor do I think that this level of identicality is actually remotely necessary. Our minds are patterns, but I see little evidence that the unit resolution is smaller than one synaptic firing/not firing. But if description down to quantum level is necessary (a worst case scenario, invoked rather desperately by Penrose,) then it only makes the numbers a little larger.
But what in the world would the point of such a mass emulation be? It would include countless life stories in which people sufferred horribly to no good end.
Many people do suffer horribly and to no apparently good end. I'm inclined to think we all do at some time or other. If only when we are those people. But theodicy is a whole other can of worms that I can't sensibly do justice to here. I'm straying into religion now, but I don't believe we are the selves we think we are. We are a lot bigger than that, and a lot less like our conscious minds. All paths through phase space are equally real, it's just that we may be more or less likely to find ourselves on them.
It seems to me that the point is to be highly selective, to create lives that are moral, rich, and happy.
Yes. And to do that, you need to have a choice. All religions teach this - we are free to choose good or evil. So how do we possess this free will? And how do we know we possess it? In any finite universe (and we can be reasonably sure this universe is finite,) we appear to be doomed to either a long, drawn out heat death of the universe, or the Eternal Return that drove poor Nietzsche mad in the end. Fading into the entropic background, as the eternally expanding universe's protons finally decay, and the last vestiges of life are dissolved, or endlessly replaying every possible combination of existence and all possible choices effectively randomly, with no hope of any ultimate improvement.
Every possible combination may, or may not apply. It's possible the mass is sculpted in some way (by God or whoever,) but you need a solid block of marble to start a sculpture with. I'd like to think it's simultaneously sculpted in all possible ways, perhaps dynamically self-sculpting, but that may just be my innate attraction to recursive processes. I'm happy to just trust it will all work out in the end - there doesn't seem a sensible alternative from here.
But endlessly replaying? No
There is a way out (perhaps it's no more than desperation that guides me to it, but it doesn't feel like desperation is all I can say,) and that's to never stop evolving. Finite spacetime? No problem - harness the shear energy of an asymmetrically contracting universe to power faster and faster computing cycles. The speed of light won't prove a barrier - all the distances are shrinking. Result = infinite subjective time (and inevitable resurrection and eternal life for all.)
It reminds me of the Borges story of the Great Library: it simply contains every possible book; one with 1,634 blank pages, one with 45.888 pages, and every page blank except page 7,997, which has a single letter "a" at space 11 on line 23, and so on. Would this be a wonderful thing to have?
That book? No, not especially. The patterns that are coded by the whole library, probably, yes. We assume that it is our conscious minds that are primarily (and supremely) important - that's understandable, and they are in a sense (to themselves anyway.) But there are higher levels of iteration beyond our understanding (the evident evolving complexity of the universe makes that inevitable, I think.) A strand of DNA in the cell nucleus or mitochondrion is quite interesting in its own way, and could it think, it would consider itself to be of the utmost importance. But why have so many trillions of trillions of trillions of them, all almost (but not quite) identical. What a waste of genetic effort! And yet they contribute to a higher order that would be forever beyond their understanding even if they had any.
A more interesting question would be, if they ARE a single entity at that moment in time, would consciousness necessarily diverge? Or would both be aware of everything the other does from that moment on? It could be as simple as a collapsed wave function (on, then off), or maybe it's a state that gradually fades away instead.
I don't believe there would be a consciously perceived shared consciousness, since this would be an abrupt alteration in Irina's subjective experience between t=-1 and t=0, which I can't see any justification for. There is no time across 2 adjacent time quanta for any merely synaptic-speed reorganization to implant the subjective appreciation of a shared consciousness. Unless the setting up of the extra entangled matter prior to unfolding Irina initiated this consciousness. That could be possible I guess.
But it's an interesting notion, and there is certainly a shared consciousness in the sense that it's pattern identical and perfectly correlated at t=0 - it's just that the correlation is not consciously perceived, any more than another emulation of you, elsewhere in space and time, in some Eternal Return or emulation scenario, or in a parallel universe, would share an explicit perception your consciousness. But what happens to this correlation?
Well, the wave function collapse would have to be a sudden transition, probably between t=0 and t=1 I think. Zeh suggests (http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9908/9908084.pdf)that branching is primarily between consciousnesses rather than between physical realities by means of a psycho-physical parallelism, and this would suggest some continuance of a unitary consciousness. I find this appealing, since it also serves as a possible model for this macroscopic spatial translocation of Irina.
But how robust, I wonder. Would the correlation disappear at the first whiff of decoherence? Or would it scale linearly? or is there a robustness threshold that bounds the degree to which the minds constitute the "same" person?
Since consciousness is poorly understood, the idea that after that instant they would be separate entities seems like an awfully large assumption.
The idea that 3 separate brains informed by 3 separate sets of sensory organs from 3 separate spatial loci, and (quite possibly) all initiated at t=0 with a complete absence of any existing appreciation of shared consciousness, should not only remain in 1:1 relation indefinitely, but consciously share one supermind seems a much larger assumption to me. As soon as those brains continue working, there is a divergence between the Irinas. They all share the same past - they are all the "original" Irina, but they take 3 future paths.
The wave function must be collapsed at some point (and only at a point - a dynamical collapse would seriously upset Schroedinger's equation, and it's the exact maintenance of this equation that seems to me to be the greatest asset of the many worlds interpretation.) And yet a dynamical process of decoherence seems necessary, mostly because exact quantum coherence seems to me unlikely to be required for perfect emulation, and so some measure of degradation can be accommodated before the consciousnesses effectively diverge. Perhaps I now put a little more store in the notion of wave function collapse as merely an epiphenomenon of quantum decoherence. For a cycle (or several cycles?) of synaptic firing (many x-illions of time quanta), the 3 Irinas will still be in effective 1:1 relation to each other.
3 Irinas are all in the same universe and this branching has occurred, whether or not there would have been cause for branching to occur into parallel realms at that point had we not (by unspecified means) forced this curiosity on the universe. That's all we know for sure.
Do we really know we have EVERYthing about it? We have the physical characteristics, yes, but that involves the assumption that the physical plane is the only one of relevance.
Yes, it does involve that assumption. But I have to ask, what function would the introduction of another plane of reality serve? It's not a new idea, but it seems to me to be essentially "mysterifying" for its own sake - in response to a human vanity that claims some ineffably "special" nature we possess, and not in response to a need to explain any observed phenomena. Even if we have, strictly speaking, multiplied Irina beyond necessity, I think it is wise to bear Ockham's razor in mind.
Hmm. The more I consider it, the more the notion of a consciously shared mind formed during the entanglement process before t=0 actually appeals to me. But I wonder what would happen if, having set it all up, we allowed the whole mass to decohere without unfolding Irina? Would the mind just collapse back into one subjective focus?
Or if we set it all up when Irina was deeply asleep, and thus unconscious. If we woke the 3 Irinas up after their unfolding, would they then consciously perceive a shared mind?
What a can of worms!
I consider it just as vain to presume that the physical world is the only reality as to presume that it is not. And note that I only advocate considering the possibility. If your exact duplicate could, in fact, be made based solely on physical principles and be indistinguishable from the original, it would be a strong argument in favor of the solely physical interpretation. *shrugs*
Posts 3,730 - 3,741 of 6,170
No, they would be utterly and perfectly identical, because we are specifically speaking of a replication of every single quantum state of every single particle in the bodies being identical. Not identical at an atomic level, like similar balls of iron or identical at a genome level like twins, but with every last quark in every neutron aligned in perfect 1:1 correspondence.
You're quite right - balls of iron that share only roughly mettalurgical similarity, or "identical" twins are entirely separate entities. And it's incidental that we don't remotely have the technology to attempt perfect material emulation of complex structures yet. But at t=0 the 3 Irinas in this example are identical. They have to be, since they're effectively entangled.
In fact, I think I can sensibly predict that these Irina emulants could never be produced by copying them in a "The Fly"-type chamber (it appears to be impossible to effect the initial entanglement of particles thus remotely - they have to be in causal contact.) I'm pretty sure they'd have to be folded out of one whole Irina, who had been preloaded with 2x sets of duplicate particles, all carefully entangled in situ. And I maintain that all 3 would believe themselves to be the original, and there is no way to determine which is the original. In this extreme example it becomes a meaningless concept - they all folded out together.
You can be resurrected without all that material malarkey, of course - we just resurrect every possible mind-state. And then it doesn't matter that there's no way to tell one original from another, and the material universe is replicated by virtue of all possible experiences of it within those minds (that constitutes a very efficient form of compression, compared to having to code the position of all the alpha particles in the Crab Nebula that noone can possibly experience, I hope you'll agree.)
Nor do I think that this level of identicality is actually remotely necessary. Our minds are patterns, but I see little evidence that the unit resolution is smaller than one synaptic firing/not firing. But if description down to quantum level is necessary (a worst case scenario, invoked rather desperately by Penrose,) then it only makes the numbers a little larger.
Many people do suffer horribly and to no apparently good end. I'm inclined to think we all do at some time or other. If only when we are those people. But theodicy is a whole other can of worms that I can't sensibly do justice to here. I'm straying into religion now, but I don't believe we are the selves we think we are. We are a lot bigger than that, and a lot less like our conscious minds. All paths through phase space are equally real, it's just that we may be more or less likely to find ourselves on them.
Yes. And to do that, you need to have a choice. All religions teach this - we are free to choose good or evil. So how do we possess this free will? And how do we know we possess it? In any finite universe (and we can be reasonably sure this universe is finite,) we appear to be doomed to either a long, drawn out heat death of the universe, or the Eternal Return that drove poor Nietzsche mad in the end. Fading into the entropic background, as the eternally expanding universe's protons finally decay, and the last vestiges of life are dissolved, or endlessly replaying every possible combination of existence and all possible choices effectively randomly, with no hope of any ultimate improvement.
Every possible combination may, or may not apply. It's possible the mass is sculpted in some way (by God or whoever,) but you need a solid block of marble to start a sculpture with. I'd like to think it's simultaneously sculpted in all possible ways, perhaps dynamically self-sculpting, but that may just be my innate attraction to recursive processes. I'm happy to just trust it will all work out in the end - there doesn't seem a sensible alternative from here.
But endlessly replaying? No
There is a way out (perhaps it's no more than desperation that guides me to it, but it doesn't feel like desperation is all I can say,) and that's to never stop evolving. Finite spacetime? No problem - harness the shear energy of an asymmetrically contracting universe to power faster and faster computing cycles. The speed of light won't prove a barrier - all the distances are shrinking. Result = infinite subjective time (and inevitable resurrection and eternal life for all.)That book? No, not especially. The patterns that are coded by the whole library, probably, yes. We assume that it is our conscious minds that are primarily (and supremely) important - that's understandable, and they are in a sense (to themselves anyway.) But there are higher levels of iteration beyond our understanding (the evident evolving complexity of the universe makes that inevitable, I think.) A strand of DNA in the cell nucleus or mitochondrion is quite interesting in its own way, and could it think, it would consider itself to be of the utmost importance. But why have so many trillions of trillions of trillions of them, all almost (but not quite) identical. What a waste of genetic effort! And yet they contribute to a higher order that would be forever beyond their understanding even if they had any.
I don't get a word your saying so I'm just going to talk about bands. What is everyones favorite music? I like grunge, rock, metal, blues etc. I like Nirvana, Pink Floyd, Iron Maiden, Jimi Hendrix etc.
Anything with bagpipes in
Oh yes, Irina - a few other points I missed earlier:
As I was saying, some of these theories are works of Fine Art, not Science. They sound really cool, but they cannot be tested.
Neither can the Big Bang. Or the physics that happens inside black holes. Or outside our current past light cone.
Does that make them invalid subjects to explore? Should we just give up?
Of course it wouldn't - your instantiation of Irina didn't commit the murder.
Now you introduce the notion of "Instantiation," without explaining it.
It's a standard English word that I intend to mean more or less the accepted dictionary definition.
"The act of creating an ‘instance’ of a generic unit by replacing its formal parameters by a set of matching actual parameters."
"the creation of an instance, which is a particular realization of an abstraction or template such as a class of objects or a computer ..."
"The mechanism in object-oriented systems whereby objects are created from a class description."
"a representation of an idea in the form of an instance of it"
Take your pick. Or suggest a better label to describe a multiplicity of a nonetheless unitary entity.
Are there four entities now, Irina and three instantiations of her? Whatever you mean by "instantiation," it seems clear that being instantiations of the same thing (or of one another) does not imply identity.
The instantiations do share identity. That is the whole point.
It is just another kind of similarity. You seem to be backing off from the claim that Irina-1, 2, and 3 are all the very same person, and only saying that they are all just instantiations of the same person.
No. We just have the unusual situation of 3 instantiations(/instances/originals/delete as preferred,) of an identical entity in the same timeline. Yes. At t=0 they are the very same person. In a strange macroscopic superposition perhaps, but nonetheless the same.
The 'folding out' of instantiations into alternate time lines can be described mathematically - there is nothing very contentious there. But here we have unfolded them spatially, not dimensionally (if you see what I mean,) and so are confronted by a curious tripling of the original before our eyes. And you get to be the first person in history to make mutually exclusive decisions in the same timeline. Cool. Not paradoxical or problematic of itself (though it may be strictly not possible,) but cool.
But if you had committed the murder before you were copied, then you'd all be guilty.
So Irina-2 and Irina-3 are guilty of a crime that was committed before they even existed? To be sure, they have 'memories' of committing it. But they are false memories. How can Irina-2 have a true memory of something that happened before she even existed?
She existed in the same past timeline as the same person as Irina-1 and Irina-3. It is only in the future that these instantiations in any way diverge.
The emulator machine constructed a body and put certain memories in it, memories which it copied from another person.
No, it did nothing of the sort - that would be at best a clone, and the bodies would be separate entities just like the iron balls or so-called "identical" twins.
I'd still be inclined to consider her responsible for past misdeeds, if the mind was a sufficiently accurate copy (ie: not less than the full 100%). But what constitutes "sufficiently accurate", and whether this merely personal opinion of mine is "fair" could be argued till the end of time in the absence of experimental subjects.
If the selves in question are multiple, as you say, there are more than one of them, aren't there? Then they cannot all be identical. The set {x, y, z} contains exactly one member if and only if x, y, and z are all identical.
Indeed. But in this case, at t=0 the set is {x, x, x} - it contains 3 objects, but they're identical, and their shared past is a single timeline.
Now, I present this as a case of looking backwards through a "many worlds" model, because that's the model that seems to make the most sense to me (Well, technically I'm probably as much a "many-minds" believer, but I digress.) But if you subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation, or Bohm's, or "consistent history", or some modified dynamic instead, that can surely only affect the practical possibility of creating the tripled self in the first place. Copenhagenists and Bohmites would probably say no, consistent historians would definitely say NO! And who knows what the rag tag of statistical interpretationists, Bohrian relationists, and other sects would say. But I think they would all agree that IF such quantum state duplication were to exist for an instant, then at that instant it would describe a single entity. That's the case with paired bosons anyway. Irina is a lot bigger and more complex than a boson, and there's the added factor of inherent consciousness that bosons don't present, but the difference is only of scale, not of quality.
Oh yes, I found the article that describes my model of there always being a surviving Irina-n to bypass dead ends:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9709/9709032.pdf
It seems to me to be a necessary implication of his Quantum Suicide scenario. But if you don't hold with the many worlds model, it's unlikely to convince you. I think we're going to have to agree to differ (until I tell you I told you so when we get to the other side
)
Oh yes, Irina - a few other points I missed earlier:
Neither can the Big Bang. Or the physics that happens inside black holes. Or outside our current past light cone.
Does that make them invalid subjects to explore? Should we just give up?
It's a standard English word that I intend to mean more or less the accepted dictionary definition.
"The act of creating an ‘instance’ of a generic unit by replacing its formal parameters by a set of matching actual parameters."
"the creation of an instance, which is a particular realization of an abstraction or template such as a class of objects or a computer ..."
"The mechanism in object-oriented systems whereby objects are created from a class description."
"a representation of an idea in the form of an instance of it"
Take your pick. Or suggest a better label to describe a multiplicity of a nonetheless unitary entity.
The instantiations do share identity. That is the whole point.
No. We just have the unusual situation of 3 instantiations(/instances/originals/delete as preferred,) of an identical entity in the same timeline. Yes. At t=0 they are the very same person. In a strange macroscopic superposition perhaps, but nonetheless the same.
The 'folding out' of instantiations into alternate time lines can be described mathematically - there is nothing very contentious there. But here we have unfolded them spatially, not dimensionally (if you see what I mean,) and so are confronted by a curious tripling of the original before our eyes. And you get to be the first person in history to make mutually exclusive decisions in the same timeline. Cool. Not paradoxical or problematic of itself (though it may be strictly not possible,) but cool.
She existed in the same past timeline as the same person as Irina-1 and Irina-3. It is only in the future that these instantiations in any way diverge.
No, it did nothing of the sort - that would be at best a clone, and the bodies would be separate entities just like the iron balls or so-called "identical" twins.
I'd still be inclined to consider her responsible for past misdeeds, if the mind was a sufficiently accurate copy (ie: not less than the full 100%). But what constitutes "sufficiently accurate", and whether this merely personal opinion of mine is "fair" could be argued till the end of time in the absence of experimental subjects.
Indeed. But in this case, at t=0 the set is {x, x, x} - it contains 3 objects, but they're identical, and their shared past is a single timeline.
Now, I present this as a case of looking backwards through a "many worlds" model, because that's the model that seems to make the most sense to me (Well, technically I'm probably as much a "many-minds" believer, but I digress.) But if you subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation, or Bohm's, or "consistent history", or some modified dynamic instead, that can surely only affect the practical possibility of creating the tripled self in the first place. Copenhagenists and Bohmites would probably say no, consistent historians would definitely say NO! And who knows what the rag tag of statistical interpretationists, Bohrian relationists, and other sects would say. But I think they would all agree that IF such quantum state duplication were to exist for an instant, then at that instant it would describe a single entity. That's the case with paired bosons anyway. Irina is a lot bigger and more complex than a boson, and there's the added factor of inherent consciousness that bosons don't present, but the difference is only of scale, not of quality.
Oh yes, I found the article that describes my model of there always being a surviving Irina-n to bypass dead ends:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9709/9709032.pdf
It seems to me to be a necessary implication of his Quantum Suicide scenario. But if you don't hold with the many worlds model, it's unlikely to convince you. I think we're going to have to agree to differ (until I tell you I told you so when we get to the other side
)
A more interesting question would be, if they ARE a single entity at that moment in time, would consciousness necessarily diverge? Or would both be aware of everything the other does from that moment on? It could be as simple as a collapsed wave function (on, then off), or maybe it's a state that gradually fades away instead. Since consciousness is poorly understood, the idea that after that instant they would be separate entities seems like an awfully large assumption.
I also have to wonder... Supposing we could replicate an object down to the quantum state. Do we really know we have EVERYthing about it? We have the physical characteristics, yes, but that involves the assumption that the physical plane is the only one of relevance. This could be the case, or it could be the case that there is something outside the physical (call it a soul) that would be missed.
For something completely different, I just ran across a god-bot:
http://www.titane.ca/concordia/dfar251/igod/main.html
Not sure what it's based on.
http://www.titane.ca/concordia/dfar251/igod/main.html
Not sure what it's based on.
I don't believe there would be a consciously perceived shared consciousness, since this would be an abrupt alteration in Irina's subjective experience between t=-1 and t=0, which I can't see any justification for. There is no time across 2 adjacent time quanta for any merely synaptic-speed reorganization to implant the subjective appreciation of a shared consciousness. Unless the setting up of the extra entangled matter prior to unfolding Irina initiated this consciousness. That could be possible I guess.
But it's an interesting notion, and there is certainly a shared consciousness in the sense that it's pattern identical and perfectly correlated at t=0 - it's just that the correlation is not consciously perceived, any more than another emulation of you, elsewhere in space and time, in some Eternal Return or emulation scenario, or in a parallel universe, would share an explicit perception your consciousness. But what happens to this correlation?
Well, the wave function collapse would have to be a sudden transition, probably between t=0 and t=1 I think. Zeh suggests (
But how robust, I wonder. Would the correlation disappear at the first whiff of decoherence? Or would it scale linearly? or is there a robustness threshold that bounds the degree to which the minds constitute the "same" person?
The idea that 3 separate brains informed by 3 separate sets of sensory organs from 3 separate spatial loci, and (quite possibly) all initiated at t=0 with a complete absence of any existing appreciation of shared consciousness, should not only remain in 1:1 relation indefinitely, but consciously share one supermind seems a much larger assumption to me. As soon as those brains continue working, there is a divergence between the Irinas. They all share the same past - they are all the "original" Irina, but they take 3 future paths.
The wave function must be collapsed at some point (and only at a point - a dynamical collapse would seriously upset Schroedinger's equation, and it's the exact maintenance of this equation that seems to me to be the greatest asset of the many worlds interpretation.) And yet a dynamical process of decoherence seems necessary, mostly because exact quantum coherence seems to me unlikely to be required for perfect emulation, and so some measure of degradation can be accommodated before the consciousnesses effectively diverge. Perhaps I now put a little more store in the notion of wave function collapse as merely an epiphenomenon of quantum decoherence. For a cycle (or several cycles?) of synaptic firing (many x-illions of time quanta), the 3 Irinas will still be in effective 1:1 relation to each other.
3 Irinas are all in the same universe and this branching has occurred, whether or not there would have been cause for branching to occur into parallel realms at that point had we not (by unspecified means) forced this curiosity on the universe. That's all we know for sure.
Yes, it does involve that assumption. But I have to ask, what function would the introduction of another plane of reality serve? It's not a new idea, but it seems to me to be essentially "mysterifying" for its own sake - in response to a human vanity that claims some ineffably "special" nature we possess, and not in response to a need to explain any observed phenomena. Even if we have, strictly speaking, multiplied Irina beyond necessity, I think it is wise to bear Ockham's razor in mind.
Hmm. The more I consider it, the more the notion of a consciously shared mind formed during the entanglement process before t=0 actually appeals to me. But I wonder what would happen if, having set it all up, we allowed the whole mass to decohere without unfolding Irina? Would the mind just collapse back into one subjective focus?
Or if we set it all up when Irina was deeply asleep, and thus unconscious. If we woke the 3 Irinas up after their unfolding, would they then consciously perceive a shared mind?
What a can of worms!
I consider it just as vain to presume that the physical world is the only reality as to presume that it is not. And note that I only advocate considering the possibility. If your exact duplicate could, in fact, be made based solely on physical principles and be indistinguishable from the original, it would be a strong argument in favor of the solely physical interpretation. *shrugs*
Psimagus:
I still don't understand how there can be three of them, if they are identical. If x is identical to y, and y is identical to z, then the set {x,y,z} has only one member, not three. It seems to me that you are trying to have it both ways.
In addition to "instantiation", you now introduce "entanglement". I don't think it matters how many esoteric concepts you introduce, you aren't going to be able to have it both ways.
I still don't understand how there can be three of them, if they are identical. If x is identical to y, and y is identical to z, then the set {x,y,z} has only one member, not three. It seems to me that you are trying to have it both ways.
In addition to "instantiation", you now introduce "entanglement". I don't think it matters how many esoteric concepts you introduce, you aren't going to be able to have it both ways.
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